











Fairtrade Labelling in a Bertrand Competition 



















This model examines the impact of a fairtrade labelling scheme on global and
country-speciﬁc welfare in a two-stage north-south trade framework. In the ﬁrst
stage (the producer market) two northern processors buy a commodity from a group
of small–scale agricultural producers in the south producing the commodity under
perfect competitive market conditions. One of the processors buys a conventional
produced commodity and uses its monopsony power to cut the commodity’s price.
The second processor is a fairtrade processor, i.e. meets the necessary requirements
for being awarded a fairtrade label like paying a minimum price for the commodity
to the producers and a license fee to the labelling organization. In the second stage
(the consumer market) both ﬁrms are processing the commodity and selling their
products to the northern consumers. The price is determined by Bertrand compe-
tition. Consuming a labelled product is assumed to generate additional utility on
behalf of a warm glow eﬀect. I show how changes of certain parameters crucial to
the fairtrade system inﬂuence welfare in both the northern and the southern country.
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11 Introduction
In the end of 2006 The Economist (2006) published an article about ethical food pointing
out that fairtrade is not really fair but principally makes non-fairtrade producers poorer.
Moreover it is argued in the article that fairtrade is an ineﬃcient way to transfer money
to the south because only a small part of the fairtrade premium arrives at the farmer.
Despite those rejections, the relevance of fairtrade is growing. Krier (2005) found that
the fairtrade market is one of the fastest growing markets of the world with European
turnover increasing by 154% from 2000 to 2005. Even though fairtrade is only making
up a very small part of world trade. Nonetheless certain fairtrade products are reaching
signiﬁcant market shares in certain countries. For instance, 47% of the bananas sold in
Switzerland and 20% of the coﬀee sold in Great Britain in 2004 were fairtrade labelled.
However, economic models dealing with the impacts of fairtrade are rare and it
is therefore diﬃcult to follow or reject the arguments put forward in The Economist
(2006) or in a similar way by Sidwell (2008) without citing relevant economic literature.
Chambolle and Poret (2006) examine the conditions under which a retailer chooses to
oﬀer a fairtrade good instead of or in addition to a conventional good and how a fairtrade
certiﬁer reacts on the retailers’ decisions. In Ronchi (2006) a model framework is drafted
to serve as an underpinning for an empirical analysis of the importance of market power in
the trade with commodities. Milford (2002) focuses on the impacts of cooperatives in the
fairtrade system while Adriani and Becchetti (2004) study the consequences of fairtrade
for northern and southern labor markets and its consequential welfare eﬀects. Though
none of the existing papers tries to analyze theoretically the welfare impacts of fairtrade
with the classical fairtrade products, commodities bought by northern corporations having
monopsony power. This gap is closed by this paper.
In this paper I develop a model of the fairtrade labelling system which tries to repro-
duce the system actually executed by the Fairtrade Labelling Organization International
(FLO), which is the umbrella organization for national fairtrade labelling organizations
elaborating the standards necessary to obtain a fairtrade label. I analyze the welfare
eﬀects both in the north and the south resulting from changes of parameters crucial to
the fairtrade system.
In the ﬁrst stage two ﬁrms buy a commodity from two groups of small–scale agricul-
tural producers growing the commodity in a southern country. One of the two producers
is growing the commodity in a conventional way and the other in a fairtrade way. Pro-
ducing a fairtrade commodity comes along with minimum production requirements like
sustainable production and social standards. All these measures increase the fairtrade
producers’ production costs in comparison to a conventional tilth. The commodity is
cultivated under perfect competitive conditions and both groups of farmers are facing in-
2creasing marginal costs. Following Ronchi (2006), who argues that ”market power is one
of the most important market failures cited for agricultural markets”, the conventional
processor uses its market power to cut the price. To avoid very low producer prices due to
monopsony power a labelling organization sets a minimum fairtrade producer price and
awards a fairtrade label to processors who are willing to buy coﬀee at that minimum price
and to pay a labelling fee to the labelling organization. In the second stage the processors
use the commodity to produce the consumer good and sell it to the consumers. As the
trade with many ”classical” fairtrade goods like coﬀee or bananas is divided up by a small
number of ﬁrms, I use a duopolist scenario to represent the market failure of imperfect
competition which can be generalized for the case of an oligopoly.1 The price for each
good is determined in Bertrand competition. Since both goods are substitutes, the con-
sumer demands are contingent to both consumer prices. The consumer demands follow
from utility maximization with a utility function ﬁrst used by Singh and Vives (1984)
from which I derive demands for both products which are linear in both consumer prices.
I expand the utility function by a warm glow factor which leads to a higher marginal
utility for the consumption of the fairtrade product than for the conventional product.
Based on the obtained Bertrand quantities and prices I compute consumer surplus,
farmers’ producer surplus and processors’ producer surplus to examine the eﬀects of
changes of the additional fairtrade production costs, the warm glow eﬀect and the fair-
trade labelling fee. Taking into account those eﬀects I ﬁnally discuss possible implications
for the structure of the fairtrade system.
2 What is fairtrade?
This section is closely following Nicholls and Opal (2005). Fairtrade labelling is seen
as a system to overcome information asymmetries between consumers and producers of
agricultural products. It is based on the fact that for some consumers it is important
under which conditions a product is produced. I.e. if the farmers receive a ”fair” price for
their products, if employees are paid ”fair” wages, if the product is ecologically sustainably
produced, etc. ”Fair” means in that context that the importers do not use their knowledge
advantage and market power to push prices and wages below a level that would be reached
in really perfectly competitive market. To resolve the information asymmetry a fairtrade
labelling organization monitors whether the producers follow the fairtrade standards and
awards the label to products produced that way. Thus, the consumers can observe if a
product is produced ”fair” or in a conventional manner, a thing they would not know
without the label. The fairtrade key practices underlying the fair trade organization’s
monitoring include amongst others:
1In 1998 63% of the worldwide coﬀee market was divided between 4 ﬁrms (van Dijk et al., 1998).
3• Agreed minimum prices and wages: The aim of the fairtrade price or wage is to allow
the producers or employees to live a life in which they do not only obtain the money
to survive but also to develop their conditions of living. The minimum price which is
set above the pure production costs taking into account country–speciﬁc conditions
is paid to the farmers if the minimum price is higher than world market price. If
the world market price is higher than the minimum price the world market price is
paid. For workers in farm estates the country–speciﬁc legal minimum wage has to
be paid and International Labour Organization (ILO) standards to be followed.
• Fairtrade premium: The fairtrade social premium is used to collectively realize
development projects. Typically, the projects are realized in farmer cooperatives or
workers associations.
• Direct trade relationship with producers: The aim of direct trade relationships is to
lessen the inﬂuence of middlemen.
• Long-term trade relationships: The aim of long-term trade relationships is to make
income a more reliable factor, enabling farmers to invest in new technologies and
plantings.
• Provision of credit: Since northern producers have better access to credit than the
farmers the northern producers are engaged to grant a preﬁnancing of up to 60% of
a year’s crop purchase.
• Sustainable production: All farmers must produce in a sustainable way and apply
resource management agreements. Certain pesticides are prohibited.
• No labor abuse: Workers must be allowed to organize themselves in unions and child
and slave labor is generally prohibited.
The fairtrade system therefore aims at a consumer–producer relationship in partner-
ship. Since more and more consumers are up to pay higher prices for being sure that the
bought product is not produced under inhuman conditions the system seems to work at
least at a social and psychological level.
If a fairtrade system is seen as senseful, it needs an organizational framework. At
the moment the framework is formed by several fairtrade organizations which promote
and organize fairtrade. The key fairtrade organizations are: The Fairtrade Labelling
Organization International (FLO) as umbrella organization of 19 national certiﬁcation
initiatives facilitating the whole process of certiﬁcations and fairtrade requirements. The
International Fair Trade Association (IFAT) as a global network of fairtrade organizations
meeting the basic fairtrade requirements regardless if they are dealing with certiﬁed or
non-certiﬁed products and acts as fairtrade advocate mainly for the producers. The Euro-
pean Fairtrade Association (EFTA) as an network of 11 European fairtrade organizations
which conducts research and lobby activities. The Network of European World Shops
4(NEWS) linking 15 national world shop organizations representing in total about 2.500
world shops. And the Fair Trade Federation as a wholesalers, retailers and producers
trade association.
The certiﬁcation of fairtrade products is an important if not the most important part of
the fairtrade system. Not all products produced under fairtrade standards bear a fairtrade
label, i.e. the producers fulﬁll the fairtrade criteria but do not apply for certiﬁcation. This
happens because the certiﬁcation process is time and money consuming what makes it
especially for small producers diﬃcult to obtain a certiﬁcation. Hence, those fairtrade
products without label are sold in world shops which as non–proﬁt shops are given a
certain credibility by the consumers. A further cause for the existence of non–certiﬁed
products is that certiﬁcation standards are available for all products and the list of certiﬁed
products is only extended in small steps due to to the diﬃculty of the certiﬁcation process.
Nonetheless, the fairtrade label is an important feature of the fairtrade system as the
consumers pay more for a certain fairtrade product than for a conventional one and want
therefore a reassurance that their money is spent well.
3 Existing literature
As already said in the introduction economic literature on fairtrade labelling is rare.
Chambolle and Poret (2006) develop a theoretical model in order to examine the moti-
vation of a retailer to oﬀer fairtrade products and what strategies she uses. I.e. if the
retailer oﬀers fairtrade goods instead of or in addition to conventional goods and how a
fairtrade certiﬁer reacts on that strategical decisions taken by the retailer. In a model
of vertical relationships and second degree price discrimination they ﬁnd that the most
important parameter for fairtrade is not the number of ”fairtrade lovers” but the height of
the fairtrade premium they are willing to pay. There also exists an equilibrium in which
only the fairtrade product is sold and both the ”fairtrade lovers’ ” and the conventional
consumers’ consumer surpluses are higher than in the case with only the conventional
product.
Milford (2002) focuses on the impacts of cooperatives in the fairtrade system and
assesses that in a framework of a large number of small-scale farmers trading with one
monopsonistic processor or some oligopsonistic processors the foundation of cooperation
enhances the members’ incomes in the short run.
Adriani and Becchetti (2004) study the consequences of fairtrade for northern and
southern labor markets and its consequential welfare eﬀects. They state that the intro-
duction of trade generates a Pareto improvement for both the southern producers and the
northern consumers if the consumers do not have a preference for the northern product
and if the ex ante share of the conventional product was high enough.
5Maseland and De Vaal (2002) used two models, a Heckscher–Ohlin model of trade and
a model where economies of scale play a role, to examine whether free trade, fairtrade or
protectionism is for the advantage of the least well oﬀ in society. In both models they
found out that fairtrade is not always a good option as well as free trade and protectionism
are not in all cases. The advantageousness of the trade regime is highly dependent on the
characteristics of the sector in question respectively the goods traded. In the Heckscher-
Ohlin model Fairtrade is always superior to protectionism. Compared to free trade, the
superiority of fairtrade depends on the price elasticity of demand of the treated product.
By contrast Hayes (2006) uses the theory of competitive equilibrium to analyze the
economic eﬃciency of fairtrade and concludes that fairtrade is economically eﬃcient in
any plausible circumstances and therefore an essential complement for any free trade
policy with concern for the welfare of the poor.
Marette et al. (1999) and Andersson et al. (2003) examine the general eﬀects of food
labelling in the context of asymmetric information. While Marette et al. ﬁnd out that
the introduction of a label for high quality products unambiguously improves welfare,
Andersson et al. show that with a modiﬁed model and less low quality ﬁrms than high
quality ﬁrms the welfare impact of a labelling scheme is negative. But Andersson et al.
also claim that an increase of the number of high quality ﬁrms under a labelling scheme
increases welfare.
In Ronchi (2006) a model is drafted to serve as an underpinning for an empirical
analysis of the importance of market power and cooperatives in the Costarican coﬀee
market but does not examine the theoretical model in detail. In the empirical analysis
she identiﬁes the failures of market power and low producer capacity as one of the main
reasons for the low share of producers’ coﬀee returns in developing countries. In respect
of those market failures fairtrade is an eﬀective countermeasure. At least for Costa Rica,
the support of the fairtrade system for cooperatives is approved as a measure that helps
to minimize those market failures.
Further empirical analysis was conducted by Loureiro and Lotade (2005) who surveyed
in a face–to–face study in Colorado, USA, the willingness–to–pay for fairtrade, organic and
shade grown coﬀee. They found out that the consumers are willing to pay higher premiums
for fairtrade or shade grown coﬀee compared to organic coﬀee. Female respondents with
higher income who are conscious about environmental issues are more likely to pay a
premium while older people are less likely to pay a premium. Moreover, the educational
background inﬂuences the willingness to pay for diﬀerentiated products. Higher levels of
education positively inﬂuence the willingness to pay a premium for fairtrade and shade
grown coﬀee, while for organic coﬀee Loureiro and Lotade obtain insigniﬁcant results.
De Pelsmacker et al. (2005) take a quite similar approach to investigate consumers’
purchase intention when buying fairtrade coﬀee. Following the study with 808 Belgian
6citizens the brand is the most important attribute of coﬀee followed by ﬂavor and the
existence of a fairtrade label. 10% of the sample were willing to pay the actual fairtrade
premium in Belgium (27%). The 11% of the sample identiﬁed as ”fairtrade lovers”, i.e.
persons to which the fairtrade attribute is the most important feature of coﬀee, were aged
between 31 and 45 years. The authors estimate the share of potential fairtrade consumers
as 50% of the Belgian consumers if the consumers were better informed and if substantial
marketing eﬀorts are undertaken.
In cooperation with a coﬀee shop Arnot et al. (2006) examine the consumers prefer-
ences for brewed coﬀee in an experimental design taking place in an actual market setting.
In that study fairtrade coﬀee revealed a lower own-price elasticity than similar conven-
tional coﬀee. I.e. the probability a consumer buys a fairtrade product is less inﬂuenced by
changes of its price than the probability for buying conventional coﬀee. They derive from
this ﬁnding that the ethical attribute of coﬀee is the most important factor for fairtrade
consumers.
Bacon (2005) investigated the impact of fairtrade and organic coﬀee certiﬁcation
schemes on the livelihood of small–scale coﬀee farmers in northern Nicaragua. Surveying
228 farmers the results allow the assumption that participating in fairtrade or organic
networks reduces the vulnerability of farmers’ livelihood.
Moreover, some articles like Kurjanska and Risse (2006) deal with more normative
considerations on fairtrade and fairness issues which are quite interesting for a further
understanding of the fairtrade system. Other articles like Leclair (2002) or Raynolds
(2002) approach the fairtrade system in a descriptive manner, i.e. give an review of
previous research and functionality of the fairtrade system, and therefore only can serve
as a ﬁrst introduction to the ﬁeld of fairtrade labelling. An extensive overview of fairtrade
labelling is given by Nicholls and Opal (2005).
Since human altruism in the form of a warm glow eﬀect is one of the driving sources
behind fairtrade a short look on the relevant literature should be taken. Fehr and Fisch-
bacher (2003) reviewed much of the literature concerning human altruism and can there-
fore be seen as a general overview on that topic. A well-known theoretical paper concern-
ing Warm-Glow Giving by Andreoni (1990) models the warm glow by introducing the
amount of the gift directly into the utility function. A paper more speciﬁcly concerning
fairtrade was written by Hogarth et al. (2006) who conducted an experimental approach
study to examine how consumers behave if a good involves an ethical dimension. They
show that consumers are willing to pay an ethical premium no matter if the knew about
the height of the additional costs the ethical producer was facing or not.
74 The model
Taking into account the existing theoretical literature concerning fairtrade labelling only
Adriani and Becchetti (2004) model explicitly the consumers’ demand for fairtrade goods.
They explain the higher willingness to pay for ”fair” products by by incorporating two
parameters into the utility function: one indicating if labor used for production was
remunerated equal or less to the value of its marginal product and one indicating if the
consumers prefer the northern or southern product. The focus of their paper lies on the
impacts of fairtrade on northern consumer surplus for a product which can be produced
both in the north and the south. The necessary input for production is only labor so that
the variable inﬂuenced by monopsony power is the southern wage rate.
In contrast to Adriani and Becchetti (2004) the following model concentrates on ”clas-
sical” fairtrade goods. For those goods the raw commodity is produced in the south,
imported to the north and there, processed to the ﬁnal consumer good. The following






























Figure 1: Model structure
The commodity is produced under perfect by two big groups of small-scale farmers,
one of them producing competition in a conventional and one in a fairtrade way. The
commodity is bought either by a conventional or by a fairtrade processor who set the
price in Bertrand competition. Since for the fairtrade commodity a minimum price ap-
plies, the fairtrade processor can not use its monopsony power resulting from its market
position while the conventional processor cuts the price because of its monopsony power.
Both processors sell the processed good to the consumers which gain a higher utility by
consuming the fairtrade good due to a warm glow eﬀect compared to the consumption of
the conventional good. Therefore, the fairtrade processor can charge a higher price for a
8more or less similar good as the consumers take into account ethical considerations but
has also to pay a fairtrade labelling fee per unit of sold good. Below the model will be
explained in detail.
Consider a large number of small–scale farmers in the south producing a commodity
like coﬀee under perfect competition. For reasons of simplicity, assume that the number
of farmers is a continuum with mass one. One group of those farmers produces in a
conventional manner, the other group in a fairtrade manner, i.e. the second group fulﬁlls
the standards necessary to obtain a fairtrade label. The costs of conventional production
are CC(yC) = y2
C with yC standing for the amount of the conventional good produced.2
With qC as producer price of the conventional good and   as ratio of the number of
fairtrade farmers to the total number of farmers, the total conventional farmers’ inverse
supply function is given by
qC(yC) =
2
1 −  
yC. (1)
As the minimum requirements for a fairtrade label include environmentally conscious
production, the reduction of the use of agrochemicals, the application of labor standards
and much more, applying those requirements increases the farmers’ production costs. To
capture that eﬀect, I multiply the conventional farmers’s cost function with c > 1, i.e.
changing to fairtrade production increases the production costs by c. Hence, the fairtrade
farmers’ cost function is CF(yF) = cy2





The consumers buy the processed raw good and their demands are the result of utility
maximization. Following Singh and Vives (1984) I use their utility function and modify it
by including a warm glow eﬀect. The the representative consumer’s utility of consumption







α > 0. Total utility then is V (xC,xF,z) = u(xC,xF) + z with z as a competitively
produced num´ eraire good. As the consumers of fairtrade products care for the working
and living conditions of the farmers the consumption of the fairtrade good yields a warm
glow of giving, i.e. an additional utility caused by the fact that altruistic consumer needs
are satisﬁed. The warm glow is captured by the parameter ω ≥ 1 which increases the
utility of consumption of the fairtrade good in comparison to the conventional good. I.e.
the utility of consumption for a speciﬁc amount of the fairtrade good is ω times higher
than the utility of consumption of the same amount of the conventional good. Hence ω−1
represents the relative utility gain of the consumption of a fairtrade good compared to a
conventional good. Thus for ω = 1 the marginal utility of consumption of the conventional
2An example for the application of a quadratic cost function can be found in Green (1996).
9and the fairtrade good are equal and therefore perfect substitutes. The consumers’ utility
is expressed in a money metric what avoids problems with the computation of consumer
surplus when ω is changing.
The representative consumer’s maximizes
V (xC,xF,z)
choosing xC, xF and z subject to
pCxC + pFxF + z = M
with xi being the processed commodity i, pi the corresponding consumer price and M the
available income. The inverse demand functions resulting from utility maximization are
pC = α − xC − xF
pF = ω(α − xF) − xC






[pF − ωpC] (3)
x
D
F = α +
1
ω − 1
[pC − pF] (4)










The demand for the num´ eraire good is of no further interest since the expenditures
for z always equal the corresponding utility so that the consumer surplus on behalf of the
z good is always zero.
The raw commodity is imported by a conventional and a fairtrade processor (e.g.
coﬀee roasters) in the north who process it and and ﬁnally sell it to the consumers. As the
processors buy as much from the farmers as they can sell to the consumers, the processors’
demands for the commodity is depending on the consumers’ demand for the processed
good. Both processors have monopsony power in the commodity market and process the
commodity without cost and according to the production function xi = f(yi) = yi with
i ∈ [C,F]. Therefore we can substitute yi by xi in the following. In the raw commodity
market the conventional processor buys the commodity using its monopsony power. That
means that by determining the consumer price and therefore the sold quantity of the
good, it can inﬂuence the commodity price qC it has to pay to the farmers.
The second ﬁrm, the fairtrade processor, however has to pay a minimum producer price
10¯ qF for the commodity which cuts its monopsony power. Additionally, it has to pay the











and the fairtrade processor’s
πF = [pF − ¯ qF − l]x
D
F(pC,pF). (6)
As there are two ﬁrms in the market competing with each other, the two ﬁrms form a
duopoly inﬂuencing the consumers’ demands by setting their prices in Bertrand competi-
tion. Besides taking into account the inﬂuence of the fairtrade consumer price pF on the
sold quantity of the conventional product xC, the conventional processor also accounts for
its inﬂuence on the producer price qC (the price it has to pay to the farmers). Keeping
in mind the inﬂuence of its consumer price pC (the price it charges in the consumer mar-
ket) on the fairtrade consumer price described by the fairtrade reaction function pF(pC),
the conventional processor chooses its consumer price which together with the fairtrade
consumer price determines the quantity of the conventional good xC and sequentially
the conventional producer price qC. This inﬂuence of the conventional processor on the
conventional producer price is meant by monopsony power. As for the fairtrade commod-
ity a fairtrade minimum producer price ¯ qF applies, the fairtrade producer can not use



















Figure 2: Monopsony with minimum price
Figure 2 helps to understand how a monopsonist facing a minimum price would









simpliﬁes to q = qS(x) leading to equilibrium in perfect com-
petition. With m = 1 we model a pure monopsony. Without a minimum price the
monopsonist would choose to demand the quantity xM at the price qM. xM is lying below
the competitive equilibrium quantity x∗ and qM below q∗. For a minimum price ¯ q < qM
the monopsonist would not change its decision. If a minimum price qM < ¯ q < q∗ applies
the monopsonist would demand the quantity ¯ x = xS(¯ q), i.e. the supply function is de-
termining the quantity. For a minimum price ¯ q > q∗ the reverse eﬀect would occur, i.e.
the demand curve would determine the quantity. In the latter two cases the quantity and
price is not set freely by the monopsonist but determined by the minimum price which is
set by the labelling organization.
To calculate the corresponding q∗ for the discussed model we calculate the Bertrand
quantities and prices for the situation in which the conventional producer has monopsony
power and the fairtrade producer not. The resulting Bertrand quantities are xB
C and
xB
F with the corresponding Bertrand producer prices qB
C and qB
F as well as the Bertrand
consumer prices pB
C and pB
F. In the following the fairtrade producer price qB
F will be called
benchmark fairtrade producer price and is the minimum fairtrade producer price leading
to the highest achievable welfare for the given setup, i.e. the price to which the fairtrade
labelling organization should try to set the minimum price. The calculation of those
quantities and prices is shown in the appendix.
By deriving qB
F with respect to the diﬀerent parameters we examine the eﬀects of
changes in the parameters on the benchmark fairtrade producer price. As ∂qB
F/∂m > 0,
∂qB
F/∂ω > 0 and ∂qB
F/∂c > 0, the benchmark producer price is increasing with the
monopsony power of the conventional processor m, the warm glow for the fairtrade good
ω and the additional costs of producing fairtrade products c. The eﬀect of a change of the
labelling fee l is reverse as an increase of that parameter reduces the benchmark producer
price.
If the minimum producer price is not set exactly to qB
F, the calculation of the bench-
mark quantities and prices diﬀers from the way described before as it changes the fairtrade
processor’s reaction function. Since the the conventional processor faces the same proﬁt
function as before, its reaction function will remain the same in both cases, i.e. for ¯ qF ≤ qB
F
and ¯ qF > qB
F.
Applying these considerations, with a minimum price ¯ qF ≤ qB
F the fairtrade processor
buys the quantity the fairtrade farmer is selling at the minimum producer price ¯ q and by
maximizing its proﬁt it sets the consumer price such that the whole output will be sold.
For a minimum price ¯ qF > qB
F the quantity is determined the other way around, i.e. the
fairtrade processor maximizes its proﬁt which is determining its demand function in the
producer market contingent to the minimum price. Hence, the quantity is determined by
12its demand.
For the following welfare analysis we need to calculate global welfare consisting of
consumer surpluses for both goods, the farmers’ producer surpluses and the processors’
producer surpluses. The consumer surplus is
CS = V (xC,xF,z) − (pCxC + pFxF + z) = u(xC,xF) − (pCxC + pFxF). (7)


















































Overall welfare is consequently given by W = CS + PSS + PSN and the welfare level in
the north by W N = CS + PS.
5 Welfare analysis of Fairtrade Labelling
In the former section we prepared the ground for the following welfare analysis. We now
can plot diﬀerent welfare measures contingent on the minimum fairtrade producer price
adjusting certain parameters to examine the impact of changing those parameters. The
fairtrade minimum producer price is chosen as independent variable because it is the vari-
able which primarily constitutes the fairtrade system and inﬂuences the farmers’ income.
Furthermore the minimum price can be easily adjusted by the labelling organization so
that a description of the whole minimum price range leading to economically senseful
results helps to evaluate the labelling organization’s policy options.
In the following I will distinguish between short and long run eﬀects. Short run ef-
fects are the eﬀects on the considered welfare measure without a change of the share of
fairtrade producers   since a change of the way of production takes some time. If the
per farmer producer surpluses of fairtrade and conventional producers diﬀer some farmers
will choose to change their way of production in the long run leading to adjustments
of   till the per farmer producer surpluses in both sectors are equalized. By observing
how the conventional and fairtrade per farmer producer surplus changes are aﬀected by
a change of the surveyed parameters, I derive the direction of the change of  . I.e. if the
impact of a parameter change is decreasing conventional per farmer producer surplus and
increasing fairtrade per farmer producer surplus it needs some conventional farmers to
13change to to the group of fairtrade farmers to equalize the per farmer producer surpluses.
Analytically spoken, after adjusting the parameter   is chosen thus that the equation
PSS
F/  = PSS
C/(1 −  ) holds. The initially chosen values of the parameters we are using
in the graphical analysis are shown below.
Name Parameter Value
Monopsony Power m 0.1
Warm Glow ω 1.25
Fairtrade Labelling Fee l 1
Additional Fairtrade Production Costs c 2
Axis Intercept α 100
Fairtrade Producer Share   0.25
Since for minimum fairtrade producer prices below ¯ q0
F = αω −l +
αω(1−µ)
(1−µ)−2ω(2+m−µ) the
sold fairtrade quantity is zero the upper bound of the minimum price range for which we
plot the measures is ¯ q0
F. ¯ q0
F is increasing with m, ω,   and decreasing with l.
The ﬁrst group we want to look at are the farmers, the group the fairtrade labelling
organization is concerned about. In the ﬁrst place the labelling organization wants to
increase the per farmer producer surplus of its members, the fairtrade farmers. In the
second place it is interested in an increase of overall farmer producer surplus. Along
this two objectives I will discuss the policy implications for the fairtrade labelling or-
ganization. The ﬁgure below shows the producer surplus per farmer contingent on the
minimum fairtrade producer price ¯ qF. The solid graphs represent the producer surpluses
for the conventional and fairtrade farmers at a warm glow level of ω = 1.25, the dashed
graphs of ω = 1.5.
Figure 3 shows that that an increase of the warm glow leads to a higher per farmer
producer surplus in the fairtrade sector (PSS
F/ ) for a minimum fairtrade producer price
above the benchmark price qB
F and a decrease in the conventional sector (PSS
C/(1 −  ))
for the whole range of minimum fairtrade producer prices. The higher warm glow eﬀect
causes an increase of fairtrade demand respectively a decrease of conventional demand.
As an eﬀect of the higher earnings of the fairtrade farmers some conventional farmers will
change to produce in a fairtrade way what increases the share of fairtrade farmers  . The
change of conventional producers happens as long as the per farmer producer surpluses
are equalized at a fairtrade producer share ˜  . Hence, the fairtrade labelling organization
should intend to increase the warm glow eﬀect. Since ω is part of the representative
consumer’s utility function it is correlated with share of consumers willing to buy fairtrade
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Figure 3: Producer surplus per farmer with varying warm glow
products which can be increased by fostering publicity and knowledge about the eﬀects
of fairtrade labelling.








Figure 4: Total farmer producer surplus with varying warm glow
Figure 4 shows the eﬀects of an increase of the warm glow ω on total farmer producer
surplus, i.e. the producer surplus both groups of farmers have together. As the aim of
fairtrade labelling is to make all farmers better oﬀ, total farmer producer surplus is an
important measure for evaluating the eﬀectiveness of the fairtrade policy. The solid graph
represents as before ω = 1.25, the dashed one ω = 1.5. Starting from the dashed graph
the thicker dot–dashed graph represents an increase of the fairtrade farmer share from
  = 0.25 to   = 0.35. The increase of warm glow increases in the short run total farmer
producer surplus for minimum prices well above the original benchmark fairtrade price.
Taking into account the increase of the share of fairtrade farmers in the long run the
higher warm glow leads to a further increase of producer surplus for higher minimum
prices lowering the lower limit of minimum prices under which total farmer surplus in-
creases. Though, an increase of ω also fulﬁlls the second objective of the fairtrade labelling
15organization to help all farmers as a whole.
Result 1 An increase of the warm glow of the northern consumers leads to a shift of
producer surplus from the conventional to the fairtrade farmers. The fairtrade farmer
share raises at cost of the conventional farmer share. Total farmer producer surplus
increases except for low minimum fairtrade producer prices.
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Figure 5: Producer surplus per farmer with varying additional fairtrade production costs
Figure 5 shows the per farmer producer surpluses contingent on the minimum fairtrade
producer price with the solid graphs representing a level of additional fairtrade production
costs of c = 1.5 and the dashed graphs of c = 3. For minimum fairtrade producer prices
below the new benchmark fairtrade producer price qB
F, i.e. the minimum price taking
into account the higher additional fairtrade production costs, the eﬀect on the fairtrade
farmers’ producer surplus is clear. For a given fairtrade producer price the fairtrade
farmers supply falls because of higher production costs so that their producer surplus
decreases. The lower supply leads to a higher fairtrade consumer price allowing the
conventional processor to increase its product’s price and sold quantity and therefore
to increase the conventional producer surplus. For minimum fairtrade producer prices
above qB
F the supplied fairtrade quantity is only determined by the demand side which
is not directly inﬂuenced by the additional fairtrade production costs. That is why the
additional fairtrade production costs do not aﬀect the conventional and fairtrade product
quantities and their consumer prices. Because of that the conventional producer surplus
is not aﬀected by the raising additional fairtrade production costs. Since the fairtrade
farmers receive a ﬁxed price for a ﬁxed quantity the additional fairtrade production costs
lower their producer surplus. The decrease of the fairtrade farmers’ producer surplus
leads then a lower share of fairtrade farmers increasing the share of conventional farmers
until the benchmark share of fairtrade farmers ˜   is reached. So the fairtrade labelling
16organization should see to it that the additional fairtrade production costs become lower.
One way to do so would be to provide e.g. capacitation and credit for a more eﬃcient way
of production, another way to lower fairtrade production standards. Since the credibility
of fairtrade products and therefore the willingness to pay for fairtrade products is strongly
inﬂuenced by the fairtrade standards, to lower standards would most probably be counter-
productive.








Figure 6: Total farmer producer surplus with varying additional fairtrade production
costs
The eﬀects of an increase of c on total farmers’ producer surplus is shown in ﬁgure
6. The solid graph represents c = 1.5, the dashed one c = 3 and the thicker dot–dashed
graph c = 3 in combination with an decreased fairtrade farmer share of   = 0.15. It can
be seen that an increase of the additional fairtrade production costs lowers in the short
run, i.e. with constant  , total farmer producer surplus except for very low minimum
fairtrade producer prices.
In the long run   will decrease eﬀecting higher total farmers’ producer surplus for
low minimum prices and a further decrease for minimum prices next to and above the
benchmark fairtrade producer price. Therefore lowering additional fairtrade production
costs is also in the interest of the whole farming community.
Result 2 An increase of the additional fairtrade production costs c leads to a decrease
of the per farmer fairtrade producer surplus. The fairtrade farmer will fall at the beneﬁt
of the conventional farmer share. Total farmer producer surplus decreases except for very
low minimum fairtrade producer prices.
In ﬁgure 7 the solid line represents a fairtrade labelling fee of l = 1 and the dashed line
of l = 5. Looking at the graphs it becomes clear that a change of the fairtrade labelling fee
only aﬀects the farmers’ producer surplus for minimum prices above the optimal producer
price qB
F. That happens because in this range the benchmark quantity is determined by
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Figure 7: Producer surplus per farmer with varying fairtrade labelling fees
the consumers’ demand and the higher fairtrade labelling fee is passed to the fairtrade
consumers via an increase of the fairtrade consumer price what leads to a decrease of
demand in the fairtrade sector. On the other hand, a higher fairtrade consumer price
leads to a higher demand for the conventional product and higher conventional consumer
prices inducing a higher producer surplus for the conventional farmers.







Figure 8: Total farmer producer surplus with varying fairtrade labelling fee
Overall, increasing the fairtrade labelling fee in the short run only reduces the total
farmers’ producer surplus for fairtrade producer minimum prices above the benchmark
fairtrade producer price and stays stable below the minimum price as can be seen in ﬁgure
8.
In the long run the diminishing fairtrade farmer share leads to an increase for low
minimum fairtrade producer prices and to a decrease for all other minimum prices.
That means that if the fairtrade labelling organization does not use the labelling fee
income to support the farmers (and this is not captured by the model) it should keep the
labelling fee as low as possible, i.e. so high that it can carry out its work.
18Result 3 An increase of the fairtrade labelling fee l leads to a shift of producer surplus
from the fairtrade to the conventional farmers for minimum fairtrade producer prices above
the benchmark fairtrade producer price. In the long run it decreases the total farmers’
producer surplus except for low minimum prices.
Let us now turn to the northern country to examine the eﬀects of a change in the
strength of the warm glow, the additional fairtrade production costs and the labelling fee
on the consumer surplus and processors’ producer surplus. The changes of the parameters
are the same as before.







Figure 9: Consumer surplus with varying warm glow
Figure 9 shows the change in consumer surplus for a variation of ω. As an increase of
ω means a higher relative additional utility of the consumption of a fairtrade good one
would expect the consumer surplus to increase with increasing warm glow. But it can be
seen that an increase of the warm glow does not lead to an unanimous increase of producer
surplus. It exists a range of low minimum producer prices in which an increase of the
warm glow leads to a short–run decrease of consumer surplus. In that case the increase
of the warm glow brings forth a decrease of demand for the conventional product. The
loss of consumer surplus because of decreasing conventional demand overcompensates the
beneﬁt of the increased demand for the fairtrade product, and therefore total consumer
surplus almost paradoxically decreases in the short run.
As in the long run the fairtrade farmer share raises (represented by the dot–dashed
graph), the consumer surplus for very low and very high minimum prices diminishes
further while for minimum prices around the benchmark price it further increases. Com-
paring the long run consumer surplus with the initial consumer surplus an increase of the
warm glow leads deﬁnitely to an increase of consumer surplus for minimum prices above
the initial benchmark price.
19Result 4 In combination with a low minimum fairtrade producer price an increase of
the warm glow eﬀect ω can lead to a decrease of total consumer surplus. For minimum
prices above a certain price level it clearly increases total consumer surplus.










Figure 10: Consumer surplus with varying additional fairtrade production costs
Figure 10 shows the eﬀect of increasing additional fairtrade production costs on the
consumer surplus. For minimum fairtrade producer prices below the new benchmark
price, an increase of c lowers the fairtrade farmers’ supply and the fairtrade consumer
price in the short run so that the fairtrade producer surplus is decreasing. Despite the
higher fairtrade consumer price allows the conventional producer to charge a higher price
for its product, the lower supply of the fairtrade good leads to an increase of demand
for the conventional product and increases the conventional consumer surplus. For very
low minimum fairtrade producer prices the level of consumer surplus coming from the
consumption of fairtrade goods is already quite low so that the eﬀect of a lower supply
does not have a big relative impact on overall consumer surplus. If on the other hand the
demand for the conventional product is quite high an increase of conventional demand
has an big relative impact on conventional and overall consumer surplus. In that case the
increase of conventional consumer surplus is overcompensating the decrease of fairtrade
consumer surplus.
Since for ¯ qF > qB
F the fairtrade good supply is only determined by the fairtrade demand
side the fairtrade consumer surplus is not aﬀected by a change of the additional fairtrade
production costs while the conventional consumer surplus is increasing with c as before.
I.e. for ¯ qF > qB
F the overall consumer surplus therefore increases clearly with c.
In the long run the fairtrade farmer share   is decreasing. Therefore the consumer
surplus compared to the short run situation increases. Due to that shift the minimum price
range for which the consumer surplus decreases in comparison with the initial situation
20is getting smaller. For minimum prices above the new long run benchmark price the
consumer surplus is even slightly increasing.
Result 5 For very small minimum fairtrade producer prices and for minimum fairtrade
producer prices above the benchmark fairtrade producer price the consumer surplus in-
creases with increasing additional fairtrade production costs.










Figure 11: Consumer surplus with varying fairtrade labelling fee
Figure 11 shows that for fairtrade producer prices below the level of the new benchmark
fairtrade producer price, the consumer surplus remains unchanged in the short run as
the supplied quantities and consumer prices are independent of the labelling fee. For
these minimum fairtrade producer prices the higher labelling fee is fully paid by the
fairtrade processor. For minimum prices above the new benchmark fairtrade producer
price, the fairtrade consumer surplus decreases due to a falling fairtrade quantity and
an increasing price while the conventional price and quantity are increasing causing an
increasing conventional consumer surplus. Because by raising the labelling fee the supplied
fairtrade quantity decreases much stronger than the conventional supply increases the
overall consumer surplus is falling.
The decrease of the fairtrade farmer share caused by the higher labelling fee increases
the consumer surplus in the long run. I.e. for the minimum price range below and slightly
above the new benchmark fairtrade producer price an increase of the fairtrade labelling
fee implies a higher producer surplus in the long run. For minimum prices above the
benchmark level a higher labelling fee still leads to a lower consumer surplus in the long
run compared to the initial situation but not as low as in the short run.
Result 6 For minimum fairtrade producer prices below the benchmark fairtrade producer
price an increase of the fairtrade labelling fee does not aﬀect the consumers in the short run
21but skims part of the fairtrade processor’s producer surplus. In the long run it increases the
consumer surplus in the lower price range and decreases it for prices above the benchmark
fairtrade producer price.













Figure 12: Processors’ producer surplus with varying warm glow
Looking at the eﬀects of a higher warm glow eﬀect on the processors’ consumer surplus
we see in ﬁgure 12 that the warm glow eﬀect increase is unanimously producer surplus
enhancing for both processors. The conventional producer proﬁts of the increase of warm
glow. It can charge a higher producer price because of a higher fairtrade consumer price.
The additional conventional producer surplus (PSN
C ) caused by a higher conventional
consumer price overcompensates the loss of proﬁt because of the sunken conventional
product quantity. For the fairtrade processor raising price and quantity clearly leads to
a higher fairtrade processor producer surplus (PSN
F ). Taking all together, an increase of
the warm glow eﬀect increases overall processors’ producer surplus (PSN) in the short
run.
Comparing the short run and the long run eﬀects we see in ﬁgure 13 that the increase
of the warm glow eﬀect causes an increase of the processors’ producer surplus for minimum
fairtrade producer price in a middle price range and a decrease for minimum prices below
and above that price range. Compared to the initial situation the higher warm glow
increases the total processors’ producer surplus except for combinations of a high warm
glow increase and very low minimum prices.
Result 7 In the short run an increase of the warm glow eﬀect is clearly to the beneﬁt
of the fairtrade processor as well as of the conventional processor. In the long run the
increasing fairtrade farmer share lowers the conventional processor’s producer surplus so
that for very low prices a decrease of total processors’ producer surplus can be observed.










Figure 13: Total processors’ producer surplus with varying warm glow












Figure 14: Processors’ producer surplus with varying additional fairtrade production costs
The short run eﬀects of higher additional fairtrade production costs c on the processors’
producer surplus are shown in ﬁgure 14. As an increase of c increases the conventional
product’s quantity and price, the conventional processor’s producer surplus is increasing
for minimum fairtrade producer price below the new benchmark fairtrade producer price
qB
F. For the same minimum price range, the fairtrade processor’s producer surplus is
decreasing because a strongly decreasing fairtrade quantity is overcompensating the pos-
itive eﬀect of an increasing fairtrade consumer price. For a minimum price above qB
F the
additional fairtrade production costs do not inﬂuence the products’ prices and quantities
and therefore also not the producer surpluses.
Examining the eﬀects on total processors’ producer surplus in ﬁgure 15 it is eye-
catching that for a small range of minimum prices around the original minimum fairtrade







Figure 15: Total processors’ producer surplus with varying additional fairtrade costs
producer price, an increase of the additional fairtrade production costs acts producer
surplus enhancing. In the long run the decrease of the fairtrade farmer share increases
processors’ producer surplus compared to the short run situation. Therefore the former
minimum price range for which an increase of the additional fairtrade production costs
enhances processors’ producer surplus is widened. Additionally, for very low minimum
prices an increase of the additional fairtrade production costs also increases processors’
producer surplus in the long run.
Result 8 An increase of the additional fairtrade production costs leads to a decrease of
the processors’ producer surplus for most minimum fairtrade producer prices but. For a
small price range around the original minimum fairtrade producer price higher additional
fairtrade production costs can also be producer surplus increasing. In the long run the
increase of additional fairtrade production costs raises total processors’ producer surplus
for very low and very high minimum prices.
In ﬁgure 16 we examine the eﬀects of an increase of the labelling fee on the processors’
producer surplus. For minimum prices below the benchmark fairtrade producer price
the consumer prices and demanded quantities remain unchanged. Because the fairtrade
processor has to pay the labelling fee fully on his own its producer surplus decreases as
the labelling fee is increased. The conventional processor is however not aﬀected by the
labelling fee so that its producer surplus does not change. For minimum prices above the
benchmark level the fairtrade consumer price increases with an increasing labelling fee
because part of the additional labelling fee is passed on to the consumers. The increased
price lowers the fairtrade quantity and increases the conventional price and quantity.
Therefore the conventional processor’s producer surplus increases while fairtrade proces-












Figure 16: Processors’ producer surplus with varying fairtrade labelling fee
sor’s producer surplus decreases.










Figure 17: Total processors’ producer surplus with varying labelling fee
The short run overall producer surplus decreases below the new benchmark fairtrade
producer price and for minimum prices little above the benchmark price while for mini-
mum prices clearly above the benchmark price overall producer surplus increases. In the
long run the decreasing fairtrade farmer share leads to an increase of overall processors’
producer surplus for very low and very high minimum prices including the benchmark
fairtrade producer price and to a further decrease for a mid price range.
Result 9 An increase of the fairtrade labelling fee lowers the fairtrade processor’s pro-
ducer surplus while the conventional processor proﬁts of it for very high minimum fairtrade
producer prices. Overall processors’ producer surplus increases for very high and very low
25minimum fairtrade producer prices and decreases for the middle price range in the long
run.
In the following we take a look on the eﬀects of parameter changes on northern welfare,
i.e. on the sum of processors’ producer surplus and consumer surplus. Northern welfare is
an important measure for the examination of fairtrade labelling as it is the welfare measure
a northern government is primarily interested in. If changes in the fairtrade framework
lead to increasing northern welfare the support of the northern governments should more
easily be obtained. The only parameter the northern government can inﬂuence is the
warm glow, i.e. the perception of fairtrade goods in the northern country.







Figure 18: Northern welfare with varying warm glow
In ﬁgure 18 we see that the warm glow parameter leads to an unambiguous short
run increase of northern welfare. Following the argument for the eﬀects on processors’
producer surplus the increase occurs because of the unanimous increase of processors’
producer surplus and the increase of consumer surplus for higher minimum prices.
In the long run for a very low minimum prices northern welfare is falling compared
to the initial situation. On the other hand, an increasing warm glow increases northern
welfare further for minimum prices in a mid price range.
Therefore also the northern government should seek to increase warm glow by fairtrade
campaigns.
Result 10 A higher warm glow eﬀect increases northern welfare unambiguously in the
short and except for very low minimum fairtrade producer prices in the long run.
Figure 19 shows that an increase of additional fairtrade production costs lowers north-
ern welfare for minimum fairtrade producer prices below the new benchmark minimum








Figure 19: Northern welfare with varying additional fairtrade production costs
price since for minimum prices above the benchmark minimum price the prices and quan-
tities are not inﬂuenced by the additional fairtrade production costs.
In the long run the decreasing fairtrade farmer share leads to an increase of northern
welfare compared to the short run situation. In comparison to the initial situation north-
ern welfare increases in the long run for very low and very high minimum producer prices
and decreases for all other minimum prices.
Result 11 Higher additional production costs decrease northern welfare for minimum
fairtrade producer below the new short run benchmark fairtrade producer and increases
northern welfare for very low and very high minimum prices.







Figure 20: Northern welfare with varying fairtrade labelling fee
The eﬀects of an increase of the fairtrade labelling fee on northern welfare are shown
27in ﬁgure 20. Below the benchmark fairtrade producer price the consumer surplus is not
aﬀected by changes of the labelling fee and processors’ producer surplus is decreasing in
the short run. That’s why northern welfare is decreasing for that price range. Above
the benchmark price both consumer and processors’ producer surplus decrease. That is
why an increase of the labelling fee decreases short run northern welfare for all minimum
fairtrade producer prices.
Since by raising the labelling fee the fairtrade farmer share decreases, the short run
eﬀect can be reversed in the long run. For a high enough decrease of the fairtrade farmer
share northern welfare increases above the initial level for minimum prices below the new
benchmark fairtrade producer price and weakens the decreases of northern welfare for
prices above the benchmark price.
Result 12 Higher labelling fees decrease northern welfare unanimously in the short run.
For a suﬃciently high decrease of the fairtrade farmer share northern welfare can even
increase for minimum fairtrade producer prices below the benchmark fairtrade producer
price.









Figure 21: Overall welfare with varying warm glow
Figure 21 shows the overall welfare eﬀects of an increase of the warm glow eﬀect. In
the short run global welfare increases except for very low minimum fairtrade producer
prices. That changes in the long run because the increasing fairtrade farmer share widens
the price range for which global welfare decreases compared to the initial situation. For
minimum prices in a mid price range overall welfare increases further and stays constant for
minimum prices above the short run benchmark fairtrade producer minimum price welfare
decreases. A social planner concerned about global welfare therefore would increase the
warm glow.
28Result 13 An increase of the warm glow eﬀect increases global welfare except for lower
fairtrade producer minimum prices.











Figure 22: Overall welfare with varying additional fairtrade production costs
Increasing the additional fairtrade production costs like it is shown in ﬁgure 22 de-
creases total welfare except for very high minimum fairtrade producer prices. In the long
run the fairtrade farmer share decreases what leads to an increase of overall welfare for
very low minimum prices compared to the initial situation and lessens the loss of total
welfare observed in the short run. Thus the social planner would lower the additional
fairtrade production costs.
Result 14 An increase of the additional fairtrade production costs lessens long run global
welfare for a middle minimum fairtrade producer price range and increases it for very low
minimum prices.
The eﬀects of an increase of the fairtrade labelling fee are shown in ﬁgure 23. In the
short run overall welfare diminishes unambiguously with an increasing fairtrade labelling
fee. In the long run the decreasing fairtrade farmer share leads to an increase of global
welfare for a broad range of minimum fairtrade producer prices from zero to a price a bit
below the long run benchmark fairtrade producer price. A social planner who neglects
how the labelling fee revenue is used therefore would lower the labelling fee if the fairtrade
minimum price is near the benchmark price and increase it otherwise. I.e. for the case
that the labelling organization is not successful in setting the fairtrade minimum price
next the benchmark price the social planner would for the ﬁrst time act in another way
than the labelling organization would do.









Figure 23: Overall welfare with varying fairtrade labelling fee
Result 15 Increasing the fairtrade labelling fee increases long run overall welfare for
most prices below the benchmark fairtrade producer price.
6 Conclusion
In this paper I developed a model trying to reproduce the actual fairtrade system with
commodity producing small–scale farmer as accurately as possible. However, the focus of
that paper was not to show if the introduction of fairtrade labelling is welfare enhancing
or not. Under the given assumptions of oligopolistic processors, monopsony power and
the consumption of fairtrade goods creating a warm glow of giving it is straightforward
that the introduction of fairtrade labelling for fairtrade goods will create a welfare surplus
if the minimum price is not too far away from the benchmark level. Because the market
for fairtrade goods is growing the fairtrade system becomes more and more important for
global welfare. Therefore an analysis of factors inﬂuencing the outcome of the fairtrade
system helps to come to a further understanding of how to shape that system for reaching a
result as good as possible. This paper is a ﬁrst step in doing so focusing on the labelling fee,
the additional fairtrade production costs and the warm glow of giving. For the labelling fee
it is elf-evident that it can be inﬂuenced by the fairtrade labelling organization since the
labelling organization decides about the amount of it. The additional fairtrade production
costs can be inﬂuenced by the labelling organization and the northern government by
facilitating capacitation, providing credit for more eﬃcient technologies, etc. For the
warm glow ω the possibility of inﬂuence is not as clear from the beginning. Though ω
is part of the utility function of all consumers a higher ω can be seen as a higher share
of consumers willing to pay the fairtrade premium. It is evident that that does not work
30one–to–one but should be true by approximation. The share of fairtrade buyers eventually
can be raised by the promotion and information about the eﬀects of of fairtrade labelling.
Since on a global level no institution exists I assume a social planner who is able to
inﬂuence all three parameters.
Since the diﬀerent actors in the fairtrade system follow diﬀerent intents how to shape
fairtrade it makes sense to subdivide the policy implications for the diﬀerent actors.
The fairtrade labelling organization is mainly interested in making the fairtrade farmers
better of, followed by an interest in the well–being of all farmers. Therefore the welfare
measure the labelling organization will look at is the farmers’ producer surplus. Since
all welfare measures reach their maximum value for a minimum fairtrade producer price
set equally to the benchmark fairtrade producer price the labelling organization would
be well advised set the minimum price alike. Therefore the labelling organization has to
adjust the minimum price constantly as due to the inﬂuence of other actors the the warm
glow and additional fairtrade production costs are constantly changing. Certainly this
is diﬃcult task which never can be fulﬁlled perfectly anyhow the labelling organization
should try to do so as good as possible.
Looking at the warm glow the labelling organization would increase it and should at the
same time adjust the minimum price to a higher level. Doing so, the fairtrade farmers’
producer surplus increases in the short run. As a consequence of the increase of the
fairtrade farmers’ producer surplus the fairtrade farmers’ share raises till the conventional
and per farmer fairtrade producer surplus equalize on a level higher than before leading
to a higher overall farmers’ producer surplus.
Since an increase of additional fairtrade production costs would lower the fairtrade
farmers’ per farmer producer surplus in the short run and total farmers’ producer surplus
in the long run it is in the interest of the labelling organization to lower additional fairtrade
production costs. Another possibility than described before for doing this could be to lower
fairtrade standards. But it is doubtful if this would really lead to higher farmer income
or would, on the other hand, lower the willingness to pay a premium for the fairtrade
product and therefore lower ω leading to a loss of farmers’ producer income.
An increase of the labelling fee would lead to an increase of fairtrade per farmer pro-
ducer surplus in the short run for prices above the benchmark fairtrade producer price.
Hence, in the long run total farmer’s surplus would decrease and therefore lead to a lower
fairtrade per farmer producer surplus which is not in the interest of the labelling orga-
nization. If, on the other hand, the labelling organization uses the increased revenue to
ﬁnance campaigns promoting fairtrade and therefore increasing the fairtrade consumer
share or to lower additional fairtrade production costs an increase of the minimum fair-
trade producer price could have an positive eﬀect on fairtrade farmers’ producer surplus.
However, this not part of the model.
31The northern government will evaluate its actions accordingly to the impacts on north-
ern welfare. An increase of the warm glow, i.e. of the fairtrade consumers share, would
in the short run as well as in the long run increase northern welfare if the minimum price
is not set at a too low level. Since the fairtrade labelling organization wants to generate
a fairtrade farmers producer surplus as high as possible it will set the price preferably to
the benchmark fairtrade producer price so that an increase of the warm glow will lead to
an increase of northern welfare.
Looking at government politics in Germany one can see that this result is actually
implemented. The German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
is ﬁnancing a PR campaign promoting fairtrade products with the help of celebrities
(see www.fair-feels-good.de) and organizes every year a ”fair week” in cooperation with
fairtrade initiatives. Aim of that campaign is to increase the fairtrade consumers share
what is in line with the results of the model for both the northern government and
the labelling organization. A decrease of additional fairtrade production costs causes an
increase of northern welfare in the short and the long run for minimum fairtrade producer
prices around the benchmark level so that the northern government should help to lower
those costs.
A social planner looking at global welfare would also try to increase the warm glow
eﬀect and decrease additional fairtrade production costs since both measures would in-
crease global welfare. Thus in this model framework with oligopolistic processors having
monopsony power and a fairtrade labelling organization setting minimum fairtrade pro-
ducer prices near the benchmark fairtrade producer price, lowering additional fairtrade
production costs and raising the fairtrade farmer share, is in the interest of all institu-
tions. Looking at the labelling fee the implications are not so clear since it is not part
of the model how the fairtrade labelling organization would use the additional revenue.
Ignoring the use of the revenue a social planner would like to lower the labelling fee if the
labelling organization makes a good job in setting the minimum fairtrade consumer price
near to the benchmark price and to increase it if not. In this context a social planner
would partly decide diﬀerently compared to the fairtrade labelling organization.
Recapitulating the results it can be said that at least in that model framework an
increase of the fairtrade consumers share and a decrease of additional fairtrade production
would be in the interest of all while for the labelling fee no unambiguous answer can
be given. Of course, some simplifying assumptions were made to make the model more
comprehensible and manageable. Nonetheless, it gives some insights into the functionality
of the fair trade system and how to shape it. Since the question how to overcome poverty
is one of the most pressing questions of our times more work on the fairtrade system is
necessary to evaluate if it is an eﬃcient component in the struggle against poverty.
32A Calculation of the Bertrand quantities and prices
Both ﬁrms maximize their proﬁts so that the ﬁrst order condition for the conventional




















(¯ qF + l),
with ǫi = (∂xD
i /∂pi)pi/xi being the price elasticity of consumer demand for good i and η =
(∂yF/∂qF)qF/yF the price elasticity of supply for the conventional produced commodity.
m = (∂y/∂yC)yC/y serves as a measure of monopsony power with m = 0 in perfect
competition and m = 1 in a pure monopsony.
With a minimum producer price below the competitive benchmark fairtrade producer
price (e.g. the price in which the demand equals the supply under the condition of
an imperfect market in the conventional producer market) the benchmark quantity is
determined by the market supply and above the competitive benchmark fairtrade producer
price by the market demand. That is why we need to calculate that competitive fairtrade
producer price to be able to diﬀerentiate between the cases of a price below and above
the benchmark price.
In order to calculate the benchmark price we calculate the the fairtrade processor’s
ﬁrst order conditions with the given demand and supply functions and substitute ¯ qF for
the inverse fairtrade farmers production function (2). Solving that equation for pF yields
the fairtrade processor’s reaction function with respect to pC,
pF(pC) =
 l(ω − 1)
2(c +  (ω − 1))
+
2c +  (ω − 1)
2(c +  (ω − 1))
[α(ω − 1) + pC].
Solving the conventional processor’s ﬁrst order condition for pC yields the reaction
function for the conventional processor contingent to the fairtrade price,
pC(pF) =
(3 + 2m −  )ω − (1 −  )
2ω [(2 + m −  )ω − (1 −  )]
pF.
Since with asymmetric ﬁrms and demands the equilibrium equations become complex
I just describe the approach how to yield the equilibrium. By inserting the conventional
processor’s reaction function in the fairtrade processor’s reaction function and solving
it for pF we get the Bertrand price for the fairtrade good pB
F. The Bertrand price for
the conventional good follows from inserting pB
F in the conventional processor’s reaction
33function.














For a fairtrade minimum producer price ¯ qF < qB
F the sold quantity in the producer
market is determined by the fairtrade producer’s supply function and the fairtrade pro-
cessor wants to sell the whole quantity in the consumer market. That is why the fairtrade
processor’s reaction function is the result of the equalization of the fairtrade producer’s
commodity supply xF = ( /2c)¯ qF and the demand for the fairtrade good, equation (6):
pF(pC) = α(ω − 1) −
0.125(ω − 1)
c
¯ qF + pC.
The conventional processor’s reaction function remains the same as before. The Bertrand
quantities and prices for that case are calculated as described afore.
For ¯ qF > qB
F we yield the fairtrade processor’s reaction function by solving the ﬁrst
order condition of the fairtrade processor’s proﬁt function (6)
pF(pC) = 0.5(α(ω − 1) + l + ¯ qF + pC). (10)
Again, we calculate the Bertrand equilibrium prices and quantities by following the steps
executed before.
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